⚔️Week 2020-52: The Art of War (Tactics vs. Strategy)

Disclaimer: The following quotes were consider only in respect to people's understanding about strategy and tactics over time, as best exemplification for understanding the difference between the two concepts.

"What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy." (Sun Tzu, "The Art of War", 5th century BC)

"Thus those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. [...] They conquer by strategy." (Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 5th century BC)

"The peak efficiency of knowledge and strategy is to make conflict unnecessary."(Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 5th century BC)

"In warfare, there are no constant conditions. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent will succeed and win." (Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 5th century BC)

"All men can see these tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved." (Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 5th century BC)

"When conventional tactics are altered unexpectedly according to the situation, they take on the element of surprise and increase in strategic value." (Sun Bin, Art of War, cca 4th century BC)

"Everything can collapse. Houses, bodies, and enemies collapse when their rhythm becomes deranged. [...] In large-scale strategy, when the enemy starts to collapse you must pursue him without letting the chance go. If you fail to take advantage of your enemies' collapse, they may recover." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"In strategy it is important to see distant things as if they were close and to take a distanced view of close things. It is important in strategy to know the enemy's sword and not to be distracted by insignificant movements of his sword. You must study this. The gaze is the same for single combat and for large-scale combat." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"In all forms of strategy, it is necessary to maintain the combat stance in everyday life and to make your everyday stance your combat stance. You must research this well." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"In contests of strategy it is bad to be led about by the enemy. You must always be able to lead the enemy about." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"In strategy your spiritual bearing must not be any different from normal. Both in fighting and in everyday life you should be determined though calm. Meet the situation without tenseness yet not recklessly, your spirit settled yet unbiased. Even when your spirit is calm do not let your body relax, and when your body is relaxed do not let your spirit slacken." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"In large-scale strategy, it is beneficial to strike at the corners of the enemy's force, If the corners are overthrown, the spirit of the whole body will be overthrown." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"Many things can cause a loss of balance. One cause is danger, another is hardship, and another is surprise. You must research this.

In large-scale strategy it is important to cause loss of balance. Attack without warning where the enemy is not expecting it, and while his spirit is undecided follow up your advantage and, having the lead, defeat him." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"Speed is not part of the true Way of strategy. Speed implies that things seem fast or slow, according to whether or not they are in rhythm. Whatever the Way, the master of strategy does not appear fast." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"Strategy is different from other things in that if you mistake the Way even a little you will become bewildered and fall into bad ways." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"There is timing in everything. Timing in strategy cannot be mastered without a great deal of practice." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"The important thing in strategy is to suppress the enemy's useful actions but allow his useless actions." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"The principles of strategy are written down here in terms of single combat, but you must think broadly so that you attain an understanding for ten-thousand-a-side battles." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"The wisdom of strategy is different from other things. On the battlefield, even when you are hard-pressed, you should ceaselessly research the principles of strategy so that you can develop a steady spirit." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"There is timing in the whole life of the warrior, in his thriving and declining, in his harmony and discord. Similarly, there is timing in the Way of the merchant, in the rise and fall of capital. All things entail rising and falling timing. You must be able to discern this. In strategy there are various timing considerations. From the outset you must know the applicable timing and the inapplicable timing, and from among the large and small things and the fast and slow timings find the relevant timing, first seeing the distance timing and the background timing. This is the main thing in strategy. It is especially important to know the background timing, otherwise your strategy will become uncertain." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"To attain the Way of strategy as a warrior you must study fully other martial arts and not deviate even a little from the Way of the warrior. With your spirit settled, accumulate practice day by day, and hour by hour. Polish the twofold spirit heart and mind, and sharpen the twofold gaze perception and sight. When your spirit is not in the least clouded, when the clouds of bewilderment clear away, there is the true void." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"'To move the shade' is used when you cannot see the enemy's spirit.

In large-scale strategy, when you cannot see the enemy's position, indicate that you are about to attack strongly, to discover his resources. It is easy then to defeat hin with a different method once you see his resources." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"When you have attained the way of strategy there will be nothing that you cannot understand. You will see the way in everything." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"With your spirit open and unconstricted, look at things from a high point of view. You must cultivate your wisdom and spirit. Polish your wisdom: learn public justice, distinguish between good and evil, study the Ways of different arts one by one. When you cannot be deceived by men you will have realised the wisdom of strategy." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)

"It is a principle of the art of war that one should simply lay down his life and strike. If one's opponent also does the same, it is a even match. Defeating one's opponent is then a matter of faith and destiny." (Yamamoto Tsunetomo, "Hagakure: The Book of the Samurai", cca. 1716)

"According to our classification, then, tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)

"But when one comes to the effect of the engagement, where material successes turn into motives for further action, the intellect alone is decisive. In brief, tactics will present far fewer difficulties to the theorist than will strategy." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)

"In a tactical situation one is able to see at least half the problem with the naked eye, whereas in strategy everything has to be guessed at and presumed." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)

"Many readers no doubt will consider it superfluous to make such a careful distinction between two things so closely related as tactics and strategy, because they do not directly affect the conduct of operations. Admittedly only the rankest pedant would expect theoretical distinctions to show direct results on the battlefield." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)

"Tactics and strategy are two activities that permeate one another in time and space but are nevertheless essentially different. Their inherent laws and mutual relationship cannot be understood without a total comprehension of both." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)

"The art of war in the narrower sense must now in its turn be broken down into tactics and strategy. The first is concerned with the form of the individual engagement, the second with its use. Both affect the conduct of marches, camps, and billets only through the engagement; they become tactical or strategic questions insofar as they concern either the engagement’s form or its significance. (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)

"The conduct of war, then, consists in the planning and conduct of fighting. If fighting consisted of a single act, no further subdivision would be needed. However, it consists of a greater or lesser number of single acts, each complete in itself, which [...] are called ‘engagements’ and which form new entities. This gives rise to the completely different activity of planning and executing these engagements themselves, and of coordinating each of them with the others in order to further the object of the war. One has been called tactics, and the other strategy." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)

"The distinction between tactics and strategy is now almost universal, and everyone knows fairly well where each particular factor belongs without clearly understanding why. Whenever such categories are blindly used, there must be a deep-seated reason for it. We have tried to discover the distinction, and have to say that it was just this common usage that led to it. We reject, on the other hand, the artificial definitions of certain writers, since they find no reflection in general usage." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)

"The theory of major operations (strategy, as it is called) presents extraordinary difficulties, and it is fair to say that very few people have clear ideas about its details - that is, ideas which logically derive from basic necessities." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)

"We have divided the conduct of war into the two fields of tactics and strategy. The theory of the latter, as we have already stated, will unquestionably encounter the greater problems since the former is virtually limited to material factors, whereas for strategic theory, dealing as it does with ends which bear directly on the restoration of peace, the range of possibilities is unlimited. As these ends will have to be considered primarily by the commander-in-chief, the problems mainly arise in those fields that lie within his competence. In the field of strategy, therefore, even more than in tactics, theory will be content with the simple consideration of material and psychological factors, especially where it embraces the highest of achievements." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)

"Such cases also occur in strategy, since strategy is directly linked to tactical action. In strategy too decisions must often be based on direct observation, on uncertain reports arriving hour by hour and day by day, and finally on the actual outcome of battles. It is thus an essential condition of strategic leadership that forces should be held in reserve according to the degree of strategic uncertainty." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)

"Thus, while a tactical reserve is a means not only of meeting any unforeseen manoeuvre by the enemy but also of reversing the unpredictable outcome of combat when this becomes necessary, strategy must renounce this means, at least so far as the overall decision is concerned. Setbacks in one area can, as a rule, be offset only by achieving gains elsewhere, and in a few cases by transferring troops from one area to another. Never must it occur to a strategist to deal with such a setback by holding forces in reserve." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)

"As regards tactics, the principal thing to be attended to is the choice of the most suitable order of battle for the object in view. When we come to consider the action of masses on the field, the means to be used may be an opportune charge of cavalry, a strong battery put in position and unmasked at the proper moment, a column of infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed division coolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire, or they may consist of tactical maneuvers intended to threaten the enemy’s flanks or rear, or any other maneuver calculated to diminish the confidence of the adversary. Each of these things may, in a particular case, be the cause of victory. To define the cases in which each should be preferred is simply impossible." (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)

"Every strategic line of defense should always possess a tactical point upon which to rally for defense should the enemy cross the strategic front. (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)

"Grand tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles, as well as during their progress. The guiding principle in tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that point the possession of which promises the most important results. (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)

"Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion. […] Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops." (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)

"Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:– 

1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the different combinations of which it admits.

2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and the most favorable direction for operations.

3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of operations.

4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive.

5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations.

6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or strategic front.

7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases.

8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves.

9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers.

10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of the army.

11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army, as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered.

12. Points for intrenched camps, tétes de pont, &c.

13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary.

The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different formations of troops for attack, constitute Grand Tactics. Logistics is the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the execution of strategical and tactical enterprises." (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)

"[…] the art of war consists of six distinct parts:– 

1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.

2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of×war, either for defense or for invasion.

3. Grand Tactics.

4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.

5. Engineering,–the attack and defense of fortifications.

6. Minor Tactics." (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)

"The science of strategy consists, in the first place, in knowing how to choose well a theater of war and to estimate correctly that of the enemy. To do this, a general must accustom himself to decide as to the importance of decisive points […]." (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)

"The study of the principles of strategy can produce no valuable practical results if we do nothing more than keep them in remembrance, never trying to apply them, with map in hand, to hypothetical wars, or to the brilliant operations of great captains. By such exercises may be procured a rapid and certain strategic coup-d’oeil,–the most valuable characteristic of a good general, without which he can never put in practice the finest theories in the world." (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)

"Strategy is the most important department of the art of war, and strategical skill is the highest and rarest function of military genius. (George S Hillard, "Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan, Major-general U. S. Army", 1864)

"The tactical result of an engagement forms the base for new strategic decisions because victory or defeat in a battle changes the situation to such a degree that no human acumen is able to see beyond the first battle." (Helmuth von Moltke, "Über Strategie" ["On Strategy"], 1871)

"The world is a multiplicity, a harvest-field, a battle-ground; and thence arises through human contact ways of numbering, or mathematics, ways of tillage, or agriculture, ways of fighting, or military tactics and strategy, and these are incorporated in individuals as habits of life." (George Edward Woodberry, "The Torch, and Other Lectures and Addresses", 1920)

"Nine-tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books: but the irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing across the pool, and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by thought practicing the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex." (Thomas E Lawrence, "The Evolution of A Revolt", 1920)

"In a physical contest on the field of battle it is allowable to use tactics and strategy, to retreat as well as advance, to have recourse to a ruse as well as open attack; but in matters of principle there can be no tactics, there is one straight forward course to follow and that course must be found and followed without swerving to the end." (Terence MacSwiney, "Principles of Freedom", 1921)

"The field of consciousness is tiny. It accepts only one problem at a time. Get into a fist fight, put your mind on the strategy of the fight, and you will not feel the other fellow's punches." (Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, "Flight to Arras", 1942)

"Keep the pressure on, with different tactics and actions, and utilize all events of the period for your purpose." (Saul Alinsky, "Thirteen Tactics for Realistic Radicals: from Rules for Radicals", 1971)

"It is necessary to develop a strategy that utilizes all the physical conditions and elements that are directly at hand. The best strategy relies upon an unlimited set of responses." (Morihei Ueshiba, "The Art of Peace", 1991)

"Grand strategy is the art of looking beyond the present battle and calculating ahead. Focus on your ultimate goal and plot to reach it." (Robert Greene, "The 33 Strategies of War", 2006)

More quotes on Strategy, Tactics

⛩️Week 2020-51: Suzuki Shosan - Collected Quotes

"Be aware of yourself and know yourself. No matter how much you have learned and how much you know, if you don't know yourself you don't know anything." (Suzuki Shosan, "Roankyō" ["Donkey Saddle Bridge"], 1648)

"Beginners should by all means strive for Truth. You must not force yourself to train or do zazen too vigorously before you realize the Truth. If you forcefully let out energy and practice Zen in violent ways, you will become fatigued, lose your energy, and it will all be of no use." (Suzuki Shosan, "Fumoto no Kusawake" ["Parting the Grasses at the Foot of the Mountain"], 1636) 

"Do your job with your mind as taut as an iron bow strung with wire. This is the same as Zen meditation." (Suzuki Shosan, "Roankyō" ["Donkey Saddle Bridge"], 1648)

"Look! This is the exercised power of Zen concentration. But a swordsman only exercises his power of concentration when he manipulates his sword. When he is without his sword, he loses his power of concentration. This is no good. On the contrary, the Zen man exercises his power of concentration all the time. That is why he is never defeated in doing anything." (Suzuki Shosan, "Roankyō" ["Donkey Saddle Bridge"], 1648)

"Remember such a stable and firm attitude is itself meditation practice. There is no other method of concentration to seek. Buddhism itself is about applying full attention steadily, without being disturbed by external things. Developing a confident attitude that is never pained or vexed or worried or saddened or altered or frightened is called attaining Buddhahood." (Suzuki Shosan, "Roankyō" ["Donkey Saddle Bridge"], 1648)

"Since you cannot do real zazen no matter how much I teach you, I think I’ll show you from now on how to use the vigorous energy you have when you are angry." (Suzuki Shosan, "Fumoto no Kusawake" ["Parting the Grasses at the Foot of the Mountain"], 1636)

"The strongest men and the greatest martial arts masters are born that way, so no effort can attain that; but when it comes to exerting our whole heart and disregarding our lives, to whom should we be inferior? No one should think he’ll lose, even to the greatest warriors. Why is that? Because if you back off such a person, who will back off you?" (Suzuki Shosan "Roankyō" ["Donkey Saddle Bridge"], 1648)

"There are myriad different methods of practice, but essentially they amount to no more than overcoming thoughts of yourself. The source of suffering is ego, the thought of self. To know this is reason. Once you know the reason for suffering, your sense of duty evokes effort to extinguish the thought of self with a genuine courageous mind. Fools can’t understand the source of misery and happiness; people without a sense of duty cannot break the bonds of life and death." (Suzuki Shosan, cca. 1630)

"There are those who discuss the amount of rewards and size of entitlement of those who have exercised considerable military ability, put their lives on the line, ground down their bones, and become famous. They are foolish! Why not do a warrior’s deed, costly though it be, for the sake of loyalty? People who think of rewards are nothing but military merchants." (Suzuki Shosan)

"There is a practice designed to enter the Way of Buddha by means of your profession. You should apply this idea, that a man born in a house of valor, polishing a sword and sporting a bow, should always exert the strongest attention, as if he were marching right into an army of ten million men." (Suzuki Shosan, "Roankyō" ["Donkey Saddle Bridge"], 1648)

"Those who have no prejudices in themselves do not reject people, and therefore people do not reject them." (Suzuki Shosan)

"Thus consider that you are always on duty, required to firmly apply your full attention. If you slack off, you’re useless." (Suzuki Shosan)

"Use your mind strongly even when you walk down the street, such that you wouldn’t even blink if someone unexpectedly thrust a lance at your nose. All warriors should at all time be in such state of mind in everyday life." (Suzuki Shosan)

"You seem to practice 'Empty Shell Zazen' and think that not thinking of anything is 'no-thought, no-mind'. You even start to feel good sitting vacantly. But if you do that kind of zazen you’ll lose your vigorous energy and become sick or go crazy. True 'no-thought, no-mind' zazen is just one thing - to have a dauntless mind." (Suzuki Shosan, "Roankyō" ["Donkey Saddle Bridge"], 1648)

⚛Week 2020-50: John Gall - Collected Quotes

"A complex system can fail in an infinite number of ways." (John Gall, "General Systemantics: How systems work, and especially how they fail", 1975)

"A complex system that works is invariably found to have evolved from a simple system that worked. The inverse proposition also appears to be true: A complex system designed from scratch never works and cannot be made to work. You have to start over, beginning with a working simple system." (John Gall, "General Systemantics: How systems work, and especially how they fail", 1975)

"A system represents someone's solution to a problem. The system doesn't solve the problem." (John Gall, "General Systemantics: How systems work, and especially how they fail", 1975)

"Loose systems last longer and function better." (John Gall, "General Systemantics: How systems work, and especially how they fail", 1975)

"Systems Are Seductive. They promise to do a hard job faster, better, and more easily than you could do it by yourself. But if you set up a system, you are likely to find your time and effort now being consumed in the care and feeding of the system itself. New problems are created by its very presence. Once set up, it won't go away, it grows and encroaches. It begins to do strange and wonderful things. Breaks down in ways you never thought possible. It kicks back, gets in the way, and opposes its own proper function. Your own perspective becomes distorted by being in the system. You become anxious and push on it to make it work. Eventually you come to believe that the misbegotten product it so grudgingly delivers is what you really wanted all the time. At that point encroachment has become complete. You have become absorbed. You are now a systems person." (John Gall, "General Systemantics: How systems work, and especially how they fail", 1975)

"The system always kicks back. - Systems get in the way - or, in slightly more elegant language: Systems tend to oppose their own proper functions. Systems tend to malfunction conspicuously just after their greatest triumph." (John Gall, "Systemantics: The underground text of systems lore", 1986)

"Alternating positive and negative feedback produces a special form of stability represented by endless oscillation between two polar states or conditions." (John Gall, "Systemantics: The Systems Bible", 2002)

"[...] the System may be so thoroughly organized around the familiar response strategy that a new response would require extensive restructuring - something that Systems do with the greatest reluctance and difficulty." (John Gall, "Systemantics: The Systems Bible", 2002)

"Systems-people everywhere share certain attributes, but each specific System tends to attract people with specific sets of traits. […] Systems attract not only Systems-people who have qualities making for success within the System; they also attract individuals who possess specialized traits adapted to allow them to thrive at the expense of the System; i.e., persons who parasitize the System." (John Gall, "Systemantics: The Systems Bible", 2002)

"We are accustomed to thinking that a System acts like a machine, and that if we only knew its mechanism, we could understand, even predict, its behavior. This is wrong. The correct orientation is: - and if the machine is large and complex enough, it will act like a large System. We simply have our metaphors backwards." (John Gall, "Systemantics: The Systems Bible", 2002)

"When a system is set up to accomplish some goal, a new entity has come into being - the system itself. No matter what the 'goal' of the system, it immediately begins to exhibit systems-behavior, that is, to act according to the general laws that govern the operation of all systems." (John Gall, "Systemantics: The Systems Bible", 2002)

"Almost by definition, one is rarely privileged to 'control' a disaster. Yet the activity somewhat loosely referred to by this term is a substantial portion of Management, perhaps the most important part. […] It is the business of a good Manager to ensure, by taking timely action in the real world, that scenarios of disaster remain securely in the realm of Fantasy." (John Gall, "The Systems Bible: The Beginner's Guide to Systems Large and Small"[Systematics 3rd Ed.], 2011)

"But the history of large systems demonstrates that, once the hurdle of stability has been cleared, a more subtle challenge appears. It is the challenge of remaining stable when the rules change. Machines, like organizations or organisms, that fail to meet this challenge find that their previous stability is no longer of any use. The responses that once were life-saving now just make things worse. What is needed now is the capacity to re-write the procedure manual on short notice, or even (most radical change of all) to change goals." (John Gall, "The Systems Bible: The Beginner's Guide to Systems Large and Small"[Systematics 3rd Ed.], 2011)

"Clearly, total feedback is Not a Good Thing. Too much feedback can over- whelm the response channels, leading to paralysis and inaction. Even in a system designed to accept massive feedback (such as the human brain), if the system is required to accommodate to all incoming data, equilibrium will never be reached. The point of decision will be delayed indefinitely, and no action will be taken." (John Gall, "The Systems Bible: The Beginner's Guide to Systems Large and Small"[Systematics 3rd Ed.], 2011)

"[…] even though a System may function very poorly, it can still tend to Expand to Fill the Known Universe, and Positive Feedback only encourages that tendency." (John Gall, "The Systems Bible: The Beginner's Guide to Systems Large and Small"[Systematics 3rd Ed.], 2011)

"Experts in the 'Problem' area proceed to elaborate its complexity. They design complex Systems to attack it. This approach guarantees failure, at least for all but the most pedestrian tasks. The problem is a Problem precisely because it is incorrectly conceptualized in the first place, and a large System for studying and attacking the Problem merely locks in the erroneous conceptualization into the minds of everyone concerned. What is required is not a large System, but a different approach. Trying to design a System in the hope that the System will somehow solve the Problem, rather than simply solving the Problem in the first place, is to present oneself with two problems in place of one." (John Gall, "The Systems Bible: The Beginner's Guide to Systems Large and Small"[Systematics 3rd Ed.], 2011)

"In point of fact, the System may be so thoroughly organized around the familiar response strategy that a new response would require extensive restructuring - something that Systems do with the greatest reluctance and difficulty." (John Gall, "The Systems Bible: The Beginner's Guide to Systems Large and Small"[Systematics 3rd Ed.], 2011)

"Not only Nature, but Systems generally, cannot be wise when feedbacks are unduly delayed. Feedback is likely to cause trouble if it is either too slow or too prompt. It must be adjusted to the response rhythms of the system as well as to the tempo of the actual events - a double restriction." (John Gall, "The Systems Bible: The Beginner's Guide to Systems Large and Small"[Systematics 3rd Ed.], 2011)

"Nothing is more useless than struggling against a Law of Nature. On the other hand, there are circumstances (highly unusual and narrowly defined, of course) when one’s knowledge of Systems-functions will provide precisely the measure of extra added ability needed to tip the scales of a doubtful operation in one’s favor." (John Gall, "The Systems Bible: The Beginner's Guide to Systems Large and Small"[Systematics 3rd Ed.], 2011)

"Pragmatically, it is generally easier to aim at changing one or a few things at a time and then work out the unexpected effects, than to go to the opposite extreme. Attempting to correct everything in one grand design is appropriately designated as Grandiosity. […] A little Grandiosity goes a long way. […] The diagnosis of Grandiosity is quite elegantly and strictly made on a purely quantitative basis: How many features of the present System, and at what level, are to be corrected at once? If more than three, the plan is grandiose and will fail." (John Gall, "The Systems Bible: The Beginner's Guide to Systems Large and Small"[Systematics 3rd Ed.], 2011)

"Striving for Perfection produces a kind of tunnel-vision resembling a hypnotic state. Absorbed in the pursuit of perfecting the System at hand, the striver has no energy or attention left over for considering other, possibly better, ways of doing the whole thing." (John Gall, "The Systems Bible: The Beginner's Guide to Systems Large and Small"[Systematics 3rd Ed.], 2011)

"Systems are never dealing with the real world that the rest of us have to live in, but instead with a filtered, distorted, and censored version which is all that can get past the sensory organs of the System itself." (John Gall, "The Systems Bible: The Beginner's Guide to Systems Large and Small"[Systematics 3rd Ed.], 2011)

"[…] the System has its effects on the people within it. It isolates them, feeds them a distorted and partial version of the outside world, and gives them the illusion of power and effectiveness."  (John Gall, "The Systems Bible: The Beginner's Guide to Systems Large and Small"[Systematics 3rd Ed.], 2011)

More quotes from the same author at Quotable Mathematics

⚛Week 2020-49: Marvin Minsky - Collected Quotes

"A memory should induce a state through which we see current reality as an instance of the remembered event - or equivalently, see the past as an instance of the present. […] the system can perform a computation analogous to one from the memorable past, but sensitive to present goals and circumstances." (Marvin Minsky, "K-Linesː A Theory of Memory", 1980) 

"Since we have no systematic way to avoid all the inconsistencies of commonsense logic, each person must find his own way by building a private collection of 'cognitive censors' to suppress the kinds of mistakes he has discovered in the past." (Marvin Minsky, "Jokes and their Relation to the Cognitive Unconscious", 1980) 

"When you, ‘get an idea’, or ‘solve a problem’, or have a ‘memorable experience’, you create what we shall call a K-line. This K-line gets connected to those ‘mental agencies’ that were actively involved in the memorable event. When that K-line is later ‘activated’, it reactivates some of those mental agencies, creating a ‘partial mental state’ resembling the original." (Marvin Minsky, "K-Linesː A Theory of Memory", 1980) 

"If explaining minds seems harder than explaining songs, we should remember that sometimes enlarging problems makes them simpler! The theory of the roots of equations seemed hard for centuries within its little world of real numbers, but it suddenly seemed simple once Gauss exposed the larger world of so-called complex numbers. Similarly, music should make more sense once seen through listeners' minds." (Marvin Minsky, "Music, Mind, and Meaning", 1981)

"What is the difference between merely knowing (or remembering, or memorizing) and understanding? […] A thing or idea seems meaningful only when we have several different ways to represent it - different perspectives and different associations […]. Then we can turn it around in our minds, so to speak: however it seems at the moment, we can see it another way and we never come to a full stop. In other words, we can 'think' about it. If there were only one way to represent this thing or idea, we would not call this representation thinking." (Marvin Minsky, "Music, Mind, and Meaning", 1981)

"The hardest problems we have to face do not come from philosophical questions about whether brains are machines or not. There is not the slightest reason to doubt that brains are anything other than machines with enormous numbers of parts that work in perfect accord with physical laws. As far as anyone can tell, our minds are merely complex processes. The serious problems come from our having had so little experience with machines of such complexity that we are not yet prepared to think effectively about them." (Marvin Minsky, 1986)

"For generations, scientists and philosophers have tried to explain ordinary reasoning in terms of logical principles - with virtually no success. I suspect this enterprise failed because it was looking in the wrong direction: common sense works so well not because it is an approximation of logic; logic is only a small part of our great accumulation of different, useful ways to chain things together." (Marvin Minsky, "The Society of Mind", 1987) 

"General fiction is pretty much about ways that people get into problems and screw their lives up. Science fiction is about everything else." (Marvin Minsky, "The Society of Mind", 1987)

"Unless we can explain the mind in terms of things that have no thoughts or feelings of their own, we'll only have gone around in a circle." (Marvin Minsky, "The Society of Mind", 1987)

"Every system that we build will surprise us with new kinds of flaws until those machines become clever enough to conceal their faults from us." (Marvin Minsky, "The Emotion Machine: Commonsense Thinking, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of the Human Mind", 2006)

"It makes no sense to seek a single best way to represent knowledge - because each particular form of expression also brings its particular limitations. For example, logic-based systems are very precise, but they make it hard to do reasoning with analogies. Similarly, statistical systems are useful for making predictions, but do not serve well to represent the reasons why those predictions are sometimes correct." (Marvin Minsky, "The Emotion Machine: Commonsense Thinking, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of the Human Mind", 2006)

More quotes from the author at Quotable Mathematics